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Abstract
In 1953, Jerzy Kalinowski published his paper on the logic of normative sentences.
The paper is recognized as one of the first publications on the formal system of
deontic logic. The aim of this paper is to present a tableau system for Kalinowski’s
deontic logic and to discuss some of the topics related to the paradoxes of deontic
logic.
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1. Introduction
Roughly speaking, deontic logic is a logic which deals with (or - is con-
cerned with) normative concepts such as obligation, permission or prohibi-
tion. Standard Deontic Logic (SDL, for short) is probably one of the well-
known and most studied systems of deontic logic. The language of SDL
is like that of classical propositional logic, i.e it includes (the nonempty
and denumerable set of) propositional variables and Boolean connectives,
except that it is enriched with the deontic operator O. A Hilbert-style ax-
iom system for SDL consists of axioms for classical propositional logic, (K)
O(φ→ χ)→ (Oφ→ Oχ), (D) ∼ (Oφ∧O ∼ φ) and two rules of inferences:
Detachment and Necessitation for O. However, this approach gives rise to
some problem which was aptly described by Royakkers in his book: ’De-
ontic logic has been bothered by a number of paradoxes during its entire
development. These paradoxes are logical expressions that have validity
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in a deontic system, such as SDL, but are counter-intuitive in a common
sense context, or they are logical expressions that are inconsistent.’1
Consider, as a simple example, two sentences:
(1) Grandma should love her grandchildren: Op.
(2) Grandma should love her grandchildren or kill her noisy neighbour:
O(p ∨ q).
The sentences mean diﬀerent things, but according to SDL, Grandma also
has an obligation that can be fulﬁlled by killing her noisy neighbour. It is
because
(a) p→ (p ∨ q) Disjunction Introduction Principle
(b) O(→ (p ∨ q)) by Necessitation Rule
(c) Op→ O(p ∨ q) by (K) and Detachment Rule.
The problem is known as Ross’s paradox.
Kalinowski’s approach to deontic operators diﬀers from that of the
standard modal approach. There is an important assumption behind Kali-
nowski’s logic that norms, just like logical propositions, are true or false.
To say that a norm is true (or false) is to determine the moral value of
action. ’Kalinowski believed that (. . . ) logical value of norms depends on
moral value of actions (. . . ) every action in genere is either good (g), or
bad (b) or neutral (n), although actions in concreto are always good or
bad. Good (bad) actions are such by nature and remain good (bad) in all
circumstances. On the other hand neutral actions are those which in some
circumstances are good and in other circumstances bad’([7], pp. 54-55).
The source of inspiration is clear, at least from the formal point of view.
It was  Lukasiewicz and his three-valued logic that exerted a strong inﬂu-
ence on Kalinowski. As we will see below, moral value of actions was given
in terms of 3-valued truth tables. Before going into more details, let us
introduce some notation and deﬁnitions.
Let Act0 = {α1, α2, α3, ...} be a ﬁnite set of basic action names and α¯i
denote the complement of αi (where i ∈ N), then, for a ﬁxed Act0, the set
of action names can be deﬁned as follows:
Act = Act0 ∪ {α¯1, α¯2, α¯3, . . . , α¯1, α¯2, α¯3, . . . , ¯¯α1, ¯¯α2, ¯¯α3, . . .}.
The set of formulas of Kalinowski’s deontic logic K1, K1 -formulas for
short, is inductively deﬁned in the following way:
1[8], p. 45.
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(1) if α ∈ Act, then P (α) is a K1 -formula
(2) if φ and χ are K1 -formulas, then ∼ φ and φ→ χ are K1 -formulas.
where P is a deontic operator meaning: it is permitted that, and the sym-
bols: ∼, → denote classical negation and implication, respectively.
Every K1 -formula of the form P (α) is called atomic. The connectives of
conjunction, disjunction and equivalence can be introduced via deﬁnitions
as in classical propositional logic. In standard deontic logics, it is possible
to deﬁne all the deontic operators in terms of one operator. Notice that
it also happens in Kalinowski’s deontic logic. The deontic operators O (it
is obligatory that) and F (it is forbidden that) is deﬁned in terms of the
operator P :
O(α) =df∼ P (α¯)
F (α) =df∼ P (α), where α ∈ Act.
Additionally, we can introduce by deﬁnition other deontic operators,
for example neutrality N :
N(α) =df P (α) ∧ P (α¯), where α ∈ Act.
Now let us return for a moment to Ross’s paradox. In SDL, we are
made to accept Op → O(p ∨ q) as a tautology. The problem does not
exist in K1. Neither O(p → (p ∨ q)) nor Op → O(p ∨ q) can be deduced
from p → (p ∨ q). This is a consequence of the deﬁnition of K1 -formulas.
The paradox cannot be formulated in the language of K1, and neither can
many other paradoxes, such as, the Good Samaritan Paradox, the Paradox
of Derived Obligation, Chisholm’s Paradox, etc. There is no need to look
for any counter-intuitive example of the formula O(φ→ ϕ) or O(φ ∧ ϕ) in
everyday language. The reason for that is quite simple: neither of them is
a K1 -formula.
Kalinowski’s logic is based on the classical propositional calculus. K1
is axiomatized by adding to the usual axioms and rules of classical propo-
sitional calculus the following axiom:
(AP ) ∼ P (α¯)→ P (α)
and double complement elimination rule:
(DCE) φ(α¯)/φ(α¯//α).
The notation φ(α¯//α) means that we may replace α¯ with α (and vice versa)
in the formula φ. A formula φ is provable in K1 if there is a formal proof
of φ within K1, i.e. there is a ﬁnite sequence of formulas, ϕ1, ϕ2, ... ϕn,
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each of which is an axiom of K1 or follows from the preceding formulas in
the sequence by the rules of K1. This sequence is a proof for φ if ϕn = φ.
As we have noticed there is an important assumption behind Kali-
nowski’s logic which posits that norms, just like logical propositions, are
true or false, but moral value of actions is given in terms of 3-valued truth
tables. In K1, the truth value of a compound proposition depends only on
the value of its components. To say that a norm is true (or false) is to
determine what the moral value of action is. But here the question arises:
How to determine the moral value of action? Kalinowski’s answer is as
follows: the action α is good (g, in symbols) if and only if the complement
of α is bad (b). The action α is bad (b) iﬀ the complement of α is good
(g). And ﬁnally, the action α is neutral (n, in symbols) iﬀ the complement
of α is also neutral (n). It now becomes possible to set up the truth table
for the complement of action:
α α¯
g b
b g
n n
The next question is, how to determine the logical value of norms? We
reformulate the question to ask: What kind of action is permitted, obligatory
or forbidden? For instance, if the action α is either good (g) or neutral (n),
then it is true (t, for short) that the action α is permitted (P (α)). If the
action α is bad (b), then it is false (f) that the action α is permitted (P (α)).
All these ’if-thens’ are based on some underlying philosophical assumptions
about what makes it true (or false) that an action is permitted, obligatory
or forbidden. Obviously, one can disagree with Kalinowski and express
doubts about the validity of his assumptions.
Here are the truth tables for the deontic operators:
α P (α) F (α) O(α) N(α)
g t f t f
b f t f f
n t f f t
To put it more precisely, K1-matrix is a triple ([6], p.186):
MK1 = 〈{g, b, c}, {P, F,O,N}, v〉
where {g, b, c} is a set of deontic values, {P, F,O,N} is a set of functions
from {g, b, c} to {t, f} which corresponds to the deontic operators, v is a
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function from {g, b, c} to {g, b, c} which attaches a deontic value to complex
actions.
Below we deﬁne a family of interpretation and valuation functions based
on them:
Int : Act −→ {g, b, c}
For each function Int there exists a K1-valuation v∗: K1-formulas −→
{t, f}. A K1-formula φ is a K1-tautology iﬀ φ takes the value t under any
K1-valuation.
Theorem 1. A formula φ is provable in K1 iﬀ φ a K1-tautology.
Proof. (Ibidem, pp. 187-189).
2. K1-Tableau System
In Section 2, we present a tableau based proof technique that can be used
for proving theorems in K1. We assume some familiarity with tableau
methods.2 In a nutshell, tableau lines are of the form σ : φ or τ : α, where
φ is a K1-formula and σ is a logical value (i.e. σ ∈ {t, f}); or α is an
action name and τ is a moral value (i.e. τ ∈ {g, b, n}). The notation σ : φ
intuitively means ’φ is true’ if σ = t, or ’φ is false’ if σ = f . The notation
τ : α means one of the following: ’the moral value of α is good ’ if τ = g,
’the moral value of α is bad ’ if τ = b or ’the moral value of α is neutral ’
if τ = n. We start with a line of the form f : φ. By a tableau proof of φ
(K1 -tableau proof) is meant a closed tableau with f : φ. All the branches
of a tree are obtained by the following rules:
Classical Rules
The rules for negation and implication (plus conjunction, disjunction and
equivalence) are identical to the ones used in classical propositional logic.
Negation:
(t ∼)
t :∼ φ
f : φ
(f ∼)
f :∼ φ
t : φ
Implication:
(t→)
t : φ→ χ
f : φ | t : χ
(f →)
f : φ→ χ
t : φ
f : χ
2See [1] and [3], for details.
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Notice that the rule (f →) is linear, but (t →) is a branching rule, as
expected.
Action Rules
The rules presented here are easily adapted from the truth table for the
complement of action. To be more speciﬁc:
Complement :
(gA)
g : α¯
b : α
(bA) b : α¯g : α (nA)
n : α¯
n : α
Deontic Rules
The rules coincide with the lines of the truth tables of deontic operators.
Permission:
(tP)
t : P (α)
g : α | n : α
(fP)
f : P (α)
b : α
If it is true that the action α is permitted, then α is either good or bad.
And similarly for (fP), if P (α) is false, then the action α is bad. Note that
the rule (fP) is linear while (tP) is branching.
Obligation:
(tO)
t : O(α)
g : α (fO)
f : O(α)
b : α | n : α
If it is true that the action α is obligatory, then the action is good. But if
O(α) is false, then two possibilities must be taken into account: the action
α is bad or the action α is neutral. The rule (tO) is linear, whereas (fO)
is branching.
Forbiddance:
(tF)
t : F (α)
b : α
(fF)
f : F (α)
g : α | n : α
If it is true that α is forbidden, then the action is bad. On the other hand, if
the formula F (α) is false, then two cases need to be considered: the action
α is good or the action α is neutral. Likewise, the rule (tF) is linear, but
(fF) is branching.
Neutrality :
(tN)
t : N(α)
n : α (fN)
f : N(α)
g : α | b : α
If the formula N(α) is true, then the action is neutral. But, if the formula
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is false, then the action α is either good or bad. In the same way, the rule
(tN) is linear, but (fN) is branching.
A branch of a tableau is closed if we can apply the closure rule:
Closure rules
(⊥A) x : α
y : α
closed
where α ∈ Act; x, y ∈ {b, g, n} and x 6= y.
Otherwise the branch is open. A tableau is closed if all of its branches are
closed, otherwise the tableau is open. Let φ be a formula. By a tableau
proof of φ (K1-tableau proof) we mean a closed tableau with f : φ.
Conceptually, K1-tableau proof system is an easy to used system for
proving the validity of a K1-formula.
Theorem 2. A formula φ has a K1-tableau proof iﬀ φ is valid in K1.
The examples below illustrate the usage of the tableau based proof
technique.
Example 1. A tableau proof of ∼ P (α¯)→ P (α).
(1) f : ∼ P (α¯)→ P (α) (start)
(2) t : ∼ P (α¯) (f →),(1)
(3) f : P (α) (f →),(1)
(4) b : α (fP),(3)
(5) f : P (α¯) (t ∼),(2)
(6) b : α¯ (fP),(5)
(7) g : α (bA),(6)
closed (⊥A),(4),(7)
This might seem a rather trivial example, but it clearly demonstrates
the usage of the action rules.
Example 2. A tableau proof of F (α)→ O(α¯).
(1) f : F (α)→ O(α¯) (start)
(2) t : F (α) (f →),(1)
(3) f : O(α¯) (f →),(1)
(4) b : α (tF),(2)
(5) b : α¯ (fO),(3) (7) n : α¯ (fO),(3)
(6) g : α (gA),(5) (8) n : α (nA),(7)
closed (⊥A), (4), (6) closed (⊥A), (4), (8)
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Example 3. Closed tableau for ∼ F (α)→ (∼ N(α)→ O(α)).
(1) f : ∼ F (α)→ (∼ N(α)→ O(α)) (start)
(2) t : ∼ F (α) (f →),(1)
(3) f : ∼ N(α)→ O(α) (f →),(1)
(4) f : F (α) (t ∼),(2)
(5) t : ∼ N(α) (f →),(3)
(6) f : O(α) (f →),(3)
(7) f : N(α) (t ∼),(5)
(8) g : α (fN),(7) (9) b : α (fN),(7)
(10) b : α (11) n : α (12) g : α (13) n : α
(fO),(6) (fO),(6) (fF),(4) (fF),(4)
closed closed closed closed
(⊥A), (8), (10) (⊥A), (8), (11) (⊥A), (9), (12) (⊥A), (9), (13)
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